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Summary
This paper uses multivariate regression techniques to analyse household survey data collected in
rural Tanzania in 1992 in a joint research project by TADREG (Tanzania Development Research
Group) and the University of Dar es Salaam.  It focuses on how information collected on
household and individual characteristics affect whether or not a child goes to primary school,
completes primary and attends secondary.  The regression analysis clearly shows substantial intra
household differences between the way in which household characteristics affect outcomes for
boys and girls, and how mothers’ and fathers’ influence over resource decisions differently affect
outcomes.  For example, when looking at the decision as to whether to enrol in primary school,
fathers’ education has a greater influence on boys whereas mothers’ primary education has a
greater influence on girls.  Furthermore, married mothers’ education can increase the probability
of girls enrolling in secondary school by 9.7 per cent for primary education and a further 17.6 per
cent for secondary, while having no significant effect on the enrolment of boys.  These results
imply that mothers have a relatively stronger preference for their daughters’ education and that
their education affords them either increased household decision-making power or increased
economic status.
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Preface
The work presented in this paper is part of a research Programme on Gender and Primary
Schooling in Africa which is being conducted in three African countries under the auspices of the
Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE). The main aims of the project have been to
examine the causes of low enrolments, persistence and performance of girls relative to boys and to
identify the most promising policy options to facilitate the universal enrolment of children in
primary schools.
This Working Paper uses data collected by the Tanzania Development Research Group
(TADREG) to investigate how household and individual characteristics affect whether or not a
child goes to school.
Christopher Colclough
Programme Director
11.  INTRODUCTION
This paper uses multivariate regression techniques to analyse household survey data collected in
rural Tanzania in 1992 in a joint research project by TADREG (Tanzania Development Research
Group) and the University of Dar es Salaam.  It focuses on how information collected on
household and individual characteristics can be used to determine whether a child goes to primary
school, completes primary and attends secondary.  This paper begins with some background
information on the education sector in Tanzania which outlines the provision of education as it
relates to the respective cohorts within the household sample.  The following section discusses the
framework used for the empirical work.  Section 3 describes the data sample, raising issues
related to sampling and problems with the data set.  Section 4 reports the regression results, which
are interpreted and placed in the context of other research.
Tanzania remains one of the world’s poorest countries with a per capita income estimated at
US$140 in 1994.  Over 80 per cent of the 28 million ethnically diverse population live in rural
areas, with considerable inequities in terms of living standards between rural and urban areas; 43
per cent of the rural population and 19 per cent of the urban population live below the poverty line
(World Bank 1995b).  The economy is predominantly agrarian, with agriculture comprising over
80 per cent of all employment.  Following strong government commitment to developing human
resources, social indicators (including educational attainment) followed an upward trend between
1960 and 1986; however, economic difficulties resulted in a reversal of this trend and Tanzania is
now placed poorly in relation to other SSA countries.
Prior to independence access to basic education in Tanzania was scarce, with wide inequities in
terms of race, region and gender.  Many primary schools had been established by Christian
missionaries, hence providing Christians with favourable education access.  In 1947 under 10 per
cent of the school-age population was enrolled in primary school.  At the secondary level under
one per cent of the school-age population was enrolled and no females had ever progressed
beyond the primary level (Cameron and Dodd 1970: 102, 104).
Immediately after independence in 1961 education policy focused firstly on strengthening the
secondary level, which was to expand in line with manpower planning requirements, to train local
people for the public sector in order to replace the expatriate work force, and secondly on
providing a basic education system appropriate for the emerging Socialist Tanzania.  A more
agriculturally-based primary curriculum was introduced following the Arusha Declaration in 1967
with a new policy of Education for Self-Reliance (ESR) encouraging each school to contribute to
its own upkeep through income raising activities.  Primary schooling was planned to expand
gradually so as to achieve UPE (Universal Primary Education) by 1989.  The decision to abolish
2school fees at primary level in 1973 was expected to support this expansion.  However, the
implementation date for UPE was brought forward to 1977 in the Musoma Resolution of 1974 on
the grounds that resource constraints would always be operative and delaying universal provision
of basic education was politically inconsistent for a socialist government.  The Musoma
Resolution sought to make primary education compulsory, universal and terminal.  Consequently,
in 1978 an Education Act was passed which made primary enrolment and attendance between the
ages of seven and 13 compulsory.1  Contravention of this Act led to some parents being fined or
even imprisoned.
The number of primary pupils increased almost immediately after the Musoma Resolution, with
enrolments increasing four fold during the 1970s and continuing to rise until 1983.  The
expansion at primary level was not, however, matched by a similar expansion at secondary level.
Consequently despite a small rise in the absolute numbers of secondary school enrolees, the
percentage of standard VII leavers continuing to secondary school plummeted - falling from 36
percent in 1961 to 19 per cent in 1967 and to only 7 per cent in 1980 (Knight and Sabot 1990).
The proportion rose to about 15 per cent by the early 1990s following a change in policy
regarding restrictions on the private/NGO sector in the mid 1980’s.  Prior to 1984, the private
secondary school operations were severely restricted by government.  By consequence, the
percentage of Form I pupils in non government secondary schools rose from 7 per cent in 1960 to
29 per cent in 1970 to 43 per cent in 1980 and 60 per cent in 1992.
However, the dramatic and rapid expansion at primary level, combined with declining national
economic performance and constrained government finance, had detrimental consequences in
terms of education quality.  Parents began to complain of illiterate primary graduates, the benefits
of schooling were questioned, enrolment rates declined and drop-out rates increased.  The GER
declined from a peak of 96 per cent in 1983 to an estimated 73.5 per cent in 1990.
In efforts to address the economic crisis the government turned towards more free market policies
adopting a structural adjustment programme which included a major currency devaluation, the
curtailment of government expenditure, civil service retrenchment and extensive privatisation.  In
line with these economic changes the education sector began to encourage private sector
involvement and seek a broader resource base for the financing of education.  The changing
economic environment would be expected to alter the costs and future benefits of education.  By
the mid 1990s households faced rising costs at primary and secondary levels.  Low enrolments
and high drop-outs continue to characterise the primary education system, and rising direct costs
to households have raised fears that enrolments may decline further (IDS and MOEC 1996)
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3although there has been strong government commitment to tackling the problems of the education
sector (Primary Education Master Plan 1995a).
When the TADREG rural household survey was carried out in 1992, there still remained
substantial uncertainty regarding education policy and teachers wages were considerably below
the level necessary to ensure their adequate motivation (Cooksey et al 1991).  Research indicated
widespread dissatisfaction with education provision (see Omari & Mosha 1987, Sumra 1993) and
revealed large inequities between boys’ and girls’ in performance at all levels and access to post
primary opportunities (Mbilinyi et al 1991).
In this context, the significant changes in the supply of education since 1960, influenced by
radical changes in government policy, economic fortunes and by public perceptions of the value
of education, are likely to be reflected in the educational attainment of different cohorts.  Society’s
educational attainments are dependent on both supply conditions and the willingness and ability to
pay for education at the level of the household.  Household education decisions are taken within
this supply context and actual attendance at different levels of education are dependent on both
household demand and the availability of places.
2 MODEL SPECIFICATION
2.1 Theoretical Framework
Household schooling decisions are determined by an interaction of social, cultural and economic
factors working through power relations within the household.  One can view education,
conceptually, as both a consumption and an investment good.  Parents educate their children so
that their children and their children’s children will have better life chances, and because they
enjoy having literate and educated children.  However, parents also invest in their children to
ensure that their offspring will be best placed to support them in later life.
A household production function approach has been widely used in the literature to model
household schooling decisions (Tansel 1993, Chernichovsky 1985, Duraisamy 1992).  These
models imply that there is an optimal investment in education for each child that equates the
present value of expected benefits and costs to the household of educating their children.  Costs
are incurred through the duration of a child’s schooling and include direct costs (e.g.  fees and
uniforms), opportunity costs of the child’s time (those activities foregone whilst at school and
travelling to school e.g. helping in the home or on the household farm) and other non-monetary
costs such as the possible increased risk of getting pregnant if girls attend school.  Where primary
4education is compulsory, as in Tanzania, the cost of going to school can be seen to be the direct,
opportunity and other non-monetary costs of going to school minus the costs incurred by not
going to school.  The cost of not going to school is the penalty imposed if the child is found not to
be attending school weighted by the probability of the child being caught out of school.2  This
probability is dependent on how strictly the law is adhered to, which is likely to vary by locality.
Benefits to the household from education will depend on many factors including the amount of
remittances the family are expecting from their children once they have left home, the probability
that their children will get work, the way individual children can translate education into
improved productivity and the time preferences of the household.  Where women suffer from
differential access and wage discrimination in labour markets this is likely to be detrimental to the
expected household return to investing in girl’s education.  Also, if girls marry out of their own
family into their husband’s family the parents may not be able to benefit from the returns to their
daughter’s schooling.
Although there may be an optimal investment in education, the presence of constraints may mean
that this optimum is unobtainable for some households; how close to this optimum the household
gets will depend on the characteristics of the individual household.  For example, because costs of
education are incurred before benefits are recouped some households may not have the resources
to pay for schooling and may be unable to borrow to finance their children’s schooling.  The
extent to which this constraint inhibits investment in education is likely to be related to the
parent’s education, with more educated parents being less credit-constrained than less educated
parents, ceteris paribus.  The position of the child in relation to other siblings in the household
may also affect the schooling decision.  On the one hand, children born into the family early,
when resources are stretched over fewer members of the household, may be more likely to go to
school.  On the other hand, a child born into the family later may have lower opportunity costs
than an earlier born sibling because the need to look after other siblings within the household
would be reduced.
Education can also be seen as a consumption good in two ways.  Firstly, educated children may
directly enhance their parents’ utility and secondly, there may be non-pecuniary benefits to
education for the acquiring child (i.e.  the child’s current utility may be enhanced by going to
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where B are the benefits,  r the interest rate, n the working years of the child
and s the years the child is at school.
C=  costs associated with going to school -  (probability of being caught out of school * the penalty imposed
on those flouting the education law).
5school).  When education is seen in this way the households’ preferences for educated children
will play a part in the decision to send their children to school.  This is again likely to be related to
the level of education of the parents.  Preferences for schooling of boys and girls are formed in the
context of social and cultural norms, and it is likely therefore that preferences will be gender
specific and household attributes will have a differing impact on the schooling decision for boys
and girls.
The decision to send a child to school may be made by either parent or both.  In the household
production function approach it is assumed that a combined household utility function is
maximised and resource allocation decisions are made through the ’benevolent dictatorship’ of the
household head (Becker 1981).  There has been much evidence to suggest that this assumption
does not hold and that resource allocation decisions are made by other members of the household
as well as the household head (Haddad et al 1994, Kabeer 1991).  Bargaining approaches to
household decision-making do not assume that resource allocation decisions are made through a
process of bargaining between individual members of the household.  The stronger the bargaining
power of a family member the more influence they will have on resource allocation decisions (Sen
1990).  Bargaining power will be dependent on an individual’s characteristics, and therefore the
attributes of other household members, as well as the household heads’, will be relevant when
looking at schooling decisions.  For example, if the mother is educated this is likely to improve
her bargaining power within the household and her preferences for educated children will play a
larger role in the decision to send her children to school.
This paper uses the characteristics of the household to assess the probability that a child has
attended school, controlling for village-specific effects.  The household schooling decision is
analysed at three stages of the schooling system in Tanzania.  The three decisions are whether the
household sends the child to primary school or not, whether the child completes primary school
conditional on the child having entered the primary system and, finally, whether the child attends
secondary school given that the child has already completed the primary cycle.
2.2 Empirical Specification
The three schooling decisions, outlined above, are analysed in this paper using a standard logit
model.3  It is assumed that we have a standard regression model such as:
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 For a complete description of the uses of limited dependent variables and qualitative variables in
econometrics see Maddala (1983).
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where F is the cumulative distribution function of the error term.  These probabilities form the
basis of the likelihood function which is used to obtain estimates of the parameters in equation 1
above.  For ease of computation of the model outlined above a logistic distribution has been
assumed for the error term.
The effects of any of the explanatory variables on the probability that a particular observation
belongs to either one of the two groups (i.e. whether a child enrols at school or not) are known as
marginal effects (for continuous explanatory variables) and impact effects (for dummy
explanatory variables).4  These are calculated for the variables included in equation 1 and are
reported in the results section of this paper.
Two methods can be used to analyse the differential impact of household attributes on boys’ and
girls’ education discussed in the previous section.  Firstly, two separate regressions can be run for
boys and girls with the coefficients of these regressions relating specifically to the effects for boys
and girls separately.  This approach assumes that all variables have a differing impact.  A second
approach is to pool the girls’ and boys’ samples and allow for different effects on specific
variables using slope dummies (equal to one if the child is female, zero otherwise).5  Separate
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7coefficient estimates for boys and girls can be recovered using this method and significance tests
on these can be carried out.  Additionally, the pooled regression provides a test for the
significance of the difference between the male and female coefficients.6
This paper has adopted the second approach and initially pooled regressions with slope dummies
for most of the explanatory variables were estimated.  Some of the slope dummies were dropped
due to their insignificance and a more parsimonious model, for each regression, was estimated.7
3.  DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA
3.1 Background
The data used in this paper are taken from research jointly conducted by TADREG and the
University of Dar es Salaam.  Field work was undertaken during July-September 1992 by 16
sociology and other social science students, supervised by Dr George Malekela and Dr Jo Lugalla
under the co-ordination of Dr Brian Cooksey with funding from SIDA.  Following the field work,
extensive qualitative material and basic statistics from the data were compiled and analysed
considering parental and community views of education provision and motives for opting in or out
of the education system.  Details of these findings can be found in Parents Attitudes and
Strategies Towards Education in Rural Tanzania, TADREG 1993.
The sample consisted of 16 villages, which were the home villages of second year students from
the Department of Sociology, at the University of Dar es Salaam.  These villages represent a
reasonable coverage of the country being in 12 of the country’s 20 regions and in 15 different
districts, covering agricultural, agropastoral and pastoral communities.  They cannot, however, be
taken as representative at the district, region or country level.  For this reason any relationships
arising within the multivariate analysis should be taken as describing this particular sample.
Being the home village of university students, who are an educationally elite minority, these
villages are likely to experience above average educational performance.
The primary schools within these sample villages are significantly larger than the national
average, having a mean number of pupils of 576 compared with a national mean of 335 in 1991
(TADREG 1993: 11).  Despite research findings of dilapidated conditions in most of these
schools and absence of equipment and supplies (TADREG, 1993:13), evidence which suggests
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provided a better specification.
8that larger schools are usually of better quality (IDS and MOEC 1996) implies that the schools in
these areas are still likely to be better than most schools in the country.  This is supported by the
fact that the number of selections into public secondary school (based on performance in a
nationally-set Primary School Leaving Exam in conjunction with district, gender segregated,
quotas) for the previous 10 years within the sample schools was 10 per cent above the average to
be expected, based on school size.  Consequently, it may be assumed that the higher quality
primary provision may cause, or itself may have been caused by, a relatively high demand for
education within the sample villages.
Education supply within the sample villages was found to be less affected by the UPE drive than
is reported for many in Tanzania.  Access and quality differences at primary level have been well
reported between urban and rural areas (e.g.  TADREG 1991, Komba 1995).  While this sample is
solely rural, hence removing some of the potential influence of supply differences, large
variations are still likely to exist in terms of local supply conditions.  In addition to the physical
supply of education facilities, variations in terms of the strength of the local village government
and school committee in implementing the compulsory education legislation, school level
financial contributions, gender sensitivity of the teachers and village attitudes towards the
importance of education for girls and boys may all influence the probability of school attendance
and completion.  The use of village control dummies accounts for the effect of these supply
differences and while there is insufficient information regarding supply conditions in each village
to draw any conclusions from the coefficients on these village dummies, the results in Table A2 in
the appendix interestingly show circumstances where conditions within the same village had
significantly different effects on boys and girls.
In total 702 household heads were interviewed, providing information on 3,345 family members.8
Within each village, interviewers sampled up to 45 mature households, i.e.  only those households
with some children above the school starting-age.  A random stratified sample, in proportion to
the frequency of mature male and female-headed households in the village, was collected,
resulting in one fifth of selected households being female-headed.9
Information was collected on a variety of household variables including sex, age, education and
occupation of the household head, age and education of the spouse, the number of children and
dependants, ethnicity, religion, and type of marital relationship.  The variables used in the
regression analysis are listed in Table 1.
                                                          
8Although the initial sample included 3,345 cases, due to missing values for some variables the sample used
for the regression analysis was substantially reduced.
9The Human Resource Development Survey (HRDS) in 1993/94 found that 15 per cent of households
interviewed were female headed (World Bank 1995).
9Table 1: List of Variable Names
Parameter Description
C Constant
Village Dummies
Reference category is if the household came from Chimala village, Mbeya Rural District  in Mbeya
VILL2 1 if household came from Ilolo village, Dodoma Rural Disitrict in Dodoma
VILL3 1 if household came from Kilole village, Korogwe District in Tanga
VILL4 1 if household came from Langiro village, Mbinga District in Ruvuma
VILL5 1 if household came from Longido village, Monduli District in Arusha
VILL6 1 if household came from Mabogini village, Moshi Rural District in Killimanjaro
VILL7 1 if household came from Malinyi village, Ulanga District in Morogoro
VILL8 1 if household came from Mbalizi I village, Mbeya Rural District in Mbeya
VILL9 1 if household came from Mihma Kitangiri village, Mwanza Rural District in Mwanza
VILL10 1 if household came from Mkididiri village, Ngara District in Kagera
VILL11 1 if household came from Mpui village, Sumbawanga District in Rukwa
VILL12 1 if household came from Mrara village, Babati District in Arusha
VILL13 1 if household came from Ndago Nguvumali village,  Iramba District in Singida
VILL14 1 if household came from Nyandekwa village, Kahama District in Shinyanga
VILL15 1 if household came from Sokon II village, Arumeru District in Arusha
VILL16 1 if household came from Talatala village, Kyela District in Mbeya
Ethnic Dummies
TRIBE10 1 if household is from Hehe tribe
TRIBE14 1 if household is from Kinga tribe
TRIBE33 1 if household is from Ngindo tribe
TRIBE34 1 if household is from Ngoni tribe
TRIBE42 1 if household is from Pare tribe
Religion  Set of dummy variables with the reference category being Christian households
MUSLIM 1 if household is Muslim
PAGAN 1 if household is Pagan
Occupation Set of dummy variables with the reference category being farming household head
OCCHD2 1 if cattle rearing is main occupation
OCCHD3 1 if trade is main occupation
OCCHD4 1 if household head is in paid employment
OCCHD5 1 if household head is in other occupations than those listed above
Marriage Status Set of dummy variables with the reference category being monogamous two parent family
TYPMRR 1 if household head was in a polygamous marriage
MARIT2 1 if household head was divorced
MARIT3 1 if household head was widowed
MARIT4 1 if household head was single
Education Set of dummy variables with the reference category being those heads or spouses with no formal education
HDPRIM 1 if household head completed primary
HDSEC 1 if household head completed secondary
SPOPRIM 1 if spouse completed primary
SPOSEC 1 if spouse completed secondary
ILLIT 1 if household head was illiterate
Other Variables
AGEHD Age of the household head
HEADSEX Sex of the household head.  1 if female
POSKID Position of the child in the family.  For the first born child POSKID=1
PSKDSQR Position of the child in the family squared
NOCDHH Number of children in the household
NCDHSQR Number of children in the household squared
AGEKID Age of child
10
3.2 Characteristics of the Sample
The household head may be either male or female; 16 per cent of the sample used for the
regression analysis are from female-headed households.  The variables on spouse’s education are
only included where the head was male, hence ensuring that this variables was picking up the
impact of mothers only.10  Table 2 shows some basic characteristics of the sample, disaggregated
by male and female heads.
Table 2: Means of Selected Descriptive Variables, by Gender of Household Head
Household heads Male heads Female heads Sample
Average age of head (years) 55.6 49.7 54.6
Religion (%)
Muslim 14.9 15.6 15.0
Pagan 6.1 9.2 6.6
Christian 79.0 75.2 78.4
Main Occupation (%)
Farmer 77.6 79.6 78
Cattle owner 6.5 1.1 5.6
Trade 4.2 10.4 5.2
Employed 8.2 1.7 7.1
Other 3.5 7.2 4.1
Average no.  of children in household 6.9 5.9 6.7
Type of marriage (%)
Is/was a polygamous marriage 27.3 5.7 23.7
Still married 95.6 14.5 82.4
Divorced 1.9 21.7 5.1
Widowed 2.2 41.6 8.6
Single 0.3 22.2 3.9
Heads education level (%)
Have basic literacy 78.9 69.8 77.2
Have primary education 71.0 57.2 68.7
Have secondary education 8.3 2.0 7.3
Spouses education level (%)
Have primary education 52.0 - -
Have secondary education 2.2 - -
Note: These means are weighted by the number of children in the household and exclude cases with any
missing data, therefore they may vary from those reported in TADREG 1993
The sample households were categorised into 58 different ethnic groups, although these were
concentrated in 13 groups and in general the sample villages were ethnically homogeneous.  The
villages in the sample were predominantly Christian (78 per cent of the offspring being from
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 Where the head is female and still married the husband’s education level has not been accounted for. This
sub sample is extremely small and the exclusion of the husband’s education level is unlikely to affect the
results.
11
Christian households) which is in contrast to Tanzania (mainland) where approximately 35 per
cent of the population is Muslim and 20 per cent belong to other non-Christian religions.11  Within
this sample Muslim households are fairly evenly spread between the different villages.
Female-headed households display slightly different characteristics to male-headed households.
On average female-headed households have one less child, are on average 6 years younger, and
are more likely to be involved in trading and are less likely to be employed.  The main difference
occurs in the type of marriage, with almost all male heads and only 14.5 per cent of female heads
still married.  Nearly half of the female heads are widowed, another 21.7 per cent through divorce
and 22.2 per cent have never married.  The socio economic status of female-headed households in
many African countries is lower than that of male-headed households as a consequence of the
unequal access women have to means of production.  Exclusion from land in Tanzania has been
found to result in economic vulnerability of divorced and widowed women (Swantz, 1985).  The
Tanzanian Demographic Health Survey between October 1991 and March 1992 found that
mothers who were divorced, had never married or were widowed were significantly poorer than
married mothers (Katapa and Astone 1993 cited in Kaijage and Tibaijuka 1996: 24).
Within each household detailed information was gathered on the education status of their seven
eldest children.  These offspring vary in age from seven to 56, with over three quarters of the
sample falling between the ages of 11 and 30.  Male and female enrolment rates at primary and
secondary level in the sample are fairly similar, although the net enrolment rate (NER) for girls
exceeds that for boys until the age of 15 where the reverse is true.12  The NER for 7-13 year olds
(the official primary school-age) for the sample is over 80 per cent which far exceeds national
estimates of 54.2 for 199213.  This may result from the better than average education provision and
demand in the sample villages, or alternatively from the fact that only mature households are
sampled and enrolment ratios may be higher in these households.14
Of all the offspring for which information was collected, 40 per cent are still studying; the
remainder have either terminated their formal education or, in the case of some younger children,
are yet to enrol at school.  From Table 3 it is clear that 7-9 year olds have a lower tendency to
enrol in school than 10-13 year olds.  Late enrolment is a major problem within Tanzania, the
                                                          
11Estimates for the religious breakdown of the country vary substantially as religious categorisations are no
longer used officially. People of certain religious denominations tend to be clustered, e.g. the Coast region is
predominantly Muslim, hence the percentage of each religion in any sample would depend heavily on initial
choice of region.
12NER is the proportion of the school aged population who are in school.  In this case the NER refers to the
proportion of the school aged population in the sample who are in school.
13URT (1995b) BEST.
14The TADREG (1993) report also raises the possibility that the higher sample enrolment may be an
overestimate due to a possible tendency for heads to conceal non enrolment of those children of school-age
due to fear of legal consequences, although considers this explanation unlikely.
12
HRD Survey in 1993/94 found an average age of enrolment of 9.0 years for girls and 9.7 years for
boys (World Bank 1995).  Parents interviewed within this study frequently commented that
enrolment should be postponed until the age of eight or nine since they consider seven year olds
as too young and immature to attend school.
Table 3: Proportion of Offspring and Parents that have Never Enrolled in School
Age group Male Female Household
head if male
Household
head if
female
Spouse if
household
head male
7-10 32.9 22.1 16.1 19.4 33.3
11-15 4.5 5.1 22.2 25.3 38.0
16-20 2.3 3.2 21.6 30.2 40.5
21-25 2.2 3.3 26.6 41.9 47.0
26-30 7.2 5.5 33.1 55.1 56.2
31-35 11.1 15.2 35.2 63.2 55.6
36-40 12.5 10.5 44.3 47.8 60.4
41-60 25.8 36.7 51.9 28.6 74.1
Average 8.3 7.3 26.2 38.5 45.2
Sample size 1452 1457 2470 439 2470
If the low school attendance in the first age group is caused by late rather than non enrolment then
the degree of non enrolment at primary school in the sample is relatively small, particularly given
the crisis within the primary education sector portrayed in the main report (see TADREG 1993).
This may be linked with the legal obligation to enrol children in school and possibly fairly tight
implementation of this legislation within sample villages.  Although attendance is similarly
compulsory, it is likely to be more difficult to prove absenteeism and hence to punish parents.
This may suggest that many parents enrol children for fear of being penalised but withdraw pupils
as soon as possible, in other words ’many children are registered but only a few study’ (TADREG
1993:16).  The higher percentage of offspring without any education in the older age groups and
in the older adult age groups, particularly females, reflects the trends in education supply
discussed above.  Table 4 shows the number of offspring in each age group that fall into each
category, and gives a brief indication of the supply conditions when each group was facing critical
points in time.
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Table 4: Supply conditions for each age group
Age
group
No. of
males
in the
sample
No. of
females
in the
sample
Education supply conditions
7-10 152 140 Reached the age of 7 from 1988 to 1992, during the time when
education standards were low. However, many of this group
may not yet have enrolled in school and may do so at an older
age.
11-15 290 257 Reached the age of 7 from 1983 to 1987, during the time when
education standards were declining and many families faced
severe economic problems.
16-20 346 379 Reached the age of 7 from 1979 to 1982, when overall primary
enrolments were high, although quality problems were
beginning to be felt. They would have reached Standard VII in
1986 to 1989 when the rate of expansion of secondary
education was beginning to increase and the costs of secondary
education were rising.
21-25 278 270 Reached the age of 7 in 1974 to 1978 at the peak of the UPE
drive hence explaining the high enrolments within this group.
They completed primary school in 1981-1985, when the
transition rate to secondary school had declined steeply.
26-30 208 199 Reached the age of 7 in 1969 to 1973, although prior to UPE
drive many may have enrolled at school at a later age. It is
interesting that within this group a reversion of the gender
difference occurs i.e. more girls have attended school than
boys, compared with a fairly prominent gender bias against
girls amongst the older groups and amongst the parents.
31-35 108 92 Reached the age of 7 in 1964 to 1968, post independence but at
a time when the stress for education remained on gradual
primary expansion and immediate secondary level expansion.
31-40 72 57 Reached school-age from 1959 to 1963 around the time of
independence, when education policies were yet to be
formulated and opportunities remained limited and regionally
differentiated. Christian missionaries played an important role.
41-56 31 30 Those in the older age group and most of the parents would
have began school (pre 1958) when education opportunities for
the majority were limited. Although the proportion attending
secondary was very small, for those few reaching as far as
primary completion the progression rate to secondary was
relatively high.
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Figure 1 shows that the majority of those still in primary school are within the 11-15 group,
although some are in the 16-20 age group (17 per cent of the males in this group and 11.7 per cent
of the females).
Figure 1: Educational Attainments by age group
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The percentage of those who dropped out of primary school in each age group remains fairly
similar, rising slightly for the older groups.  The proportion in each age group that attends or has
attended secondary school remains fairly constant, with a fairly consistent gap between male and
female enrolment.15  However, when expressed as a percentage of only those who have completed
primary school (shown in Table 5), the higher attendance in older groups, as discussed earlier, is
evident.  Similarly the lower representation of women at secondary level, out of those who
complete primary school, is notable in each age group.
Table 5: Proportion Attending Secondary School of those who have Completed Primary
School
Age group Male Female
11-15 20.0 13.3
16-20 25.6 22.8
21-25 26.4 23.0
26-30 30.7 22.8
31-35 39.8 30.4
36-40 41.5 31.7
41-60 36.8 42.9
Total 29.1 24.0
Sample size 894 859
                                                          
15It is likely that this sample over represents secondary attendees due to the fact that villages included in this
sample historically have had secondary education supply.
15
The lower progression of Standard VII girls into secondary school has been attributed to girls’
weaker performance at primary level in situations of constrained secondary places.  It has been
argued that the fact that private schools have a higher proportion of girls than public schools
implies that parental attitudes are quite healthy and they choose to invest in girls education
voluntarily (Omari 1995: 19).  However, the percentage of Standard VII enrolees who are not
allocated places at public school and who then attend private school is higher for boys than girls,
implying that household demand still has a differing role in boys’ and girls’ education
opportunities.16 At the time of transition between primary and secondary school girls face
additional problems arising out of puberty, expectations of marriage, risk of and actual pregnancy.
3.3 Problems Arising Within the Data Set
There are some generic problems common to the use of cross section household surveys to
investigate the education attainments of offspring.  Firstly, the information collected on the
household at the time of the survey is then used to explain education decisions which have been
made in a previous time period when the characteristics of the household may have been different.
This is likely to be particularly problematic when considering older children.  However, many of
the independent variables used in this case (e.g.  ethnicity, religion, formal education of parents)
either could not or are unlikely to have altered over time.  Parental occupation and marital status
may have altered over time, and through migration so may the households’ village location, which
is used as a control dummy.  To some extent this remains an unresolvable problem and is explored
in terms of ensuring the regression results are robust to different age sub-samples.  Secondly there
is a bias towards larger families.  Since each randomly sampled household provides information
on all children, analysis of the individual child results in a non random sample which has a bias
towards children from large families.17
Not all household and community characteristics which influence education decisions are
included within the data set used here, raising the possibility of omitted-variable bias in the
regression analysis.  Direct information on household income, expenditures and socio-economic
status are not available within this data set, yet the status of household wealth and current income
would have a strong determining influence on education decisions.  However, such data are likely
to be extremely unreliable, and highly correlated with other independent variables. Using current
household income would make the problems of changing household characteristics, discussed
above, even more severe.  Within the regressions the occupation grouping and to some degree
                                                          
16Calculated from data from URT 1995b.
17In this sample only information on the eldest seven children of the household head were taken. Therefore
the bias towards large families is slightly reduced.
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parental education levels are used to proxy for household socio-economic status.  The occupation
groups are relatively good at picking up the better off sections within the sample, however, the
broad farming category, which comprises over three quarters of the sample, is not a good
distinguisher of household income levels.  "There is a world of difference between largely
illiterate farmers in an impoverished village in Dodoma Rural or Iramba District, and the
inhabitants of a more prosperous and literate village in Mbeya or Moshi Rural" (TADREG
1993:26).  However, consideration of the village level information found that "inequities of
income and land ownership were generally insubstantial within village sub-samples", which
suggests that income differences between farmers may be partly controlled for by the village
dummies.  Village dummies, occupation groups and parental education together are likely to be
good proxies for household income levels, however, the interpretation of the impact of these
variables is likely to be difficult.
The village dummies are also used to control for local supply factors, such as the availability of
places and quality of schooling in the area.  Supply factors are likely to have been particularly
crucial prior to the expansion of education places after independence and the UPE drive. Access
to secondary level education has been found to have a positive impact on primary education
demand (Mason and Khandker 1996).  However, evidence from these mainly Christian villages
suggests a long history of relatively high education supply and only minimal increases in supply
following the UPE drive (TADREG 1993).  The village dummies also control for legal strength in
a village and perceived local penalties of contravening the compulsory enrolment and attendance
legislation.
Complete information on the direct and opportunity costs to the households is also missing, which
would include school contributions and costs of uniforms in the location and the proximity to the
local primary school.  For each individual child their ability level is also likely to influence the
willingness of parents to undergo investment in their education at primary and secondary level.
Ability level of the child will be influential in the determination of attendance at secondary
school, particularly prior to the expansion of private secondary schools.  18
Despite problems with the data set it remains extremely rich.  The inevitable absence of full
information regarding the costs and benefits to the households of childrens’ education will mean
that the effect of a variable could be proxying for other unrecorded characteristics and therefore
there may be some ambiguity regarding the interpretation of some of the significant relationships
unearthed through the regression analysis.
                                                          
18At primary level the omitting of an ability variable will result in overlooking the children of school-age
excluded from schooling due to physical or mental handicaps. According to the 1988 census these children
number 105,800 (approximately 3% of the school-age population) and almost all of them are excluded from
the education system.
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4.  RESULTS
Although a pooled regression was run for each of the three regressions the results reported here
are the male and female marginal and impact effects recoverable from the pooled regression, and
the effects of the variables that do not have gender slope dummies.19
4.1 Primary School Enrolment
The first logit was run on all of the sample, of 11 years of age and above, using as a dependent
variable whether or not an individual had ever attended primary school. The results are reported in
Table 6.  The exclusion of those under 11 was to ensure that the regression was explaining non
enrolment and to avoid the problem of censoring within the sample.  The vast majority of the
sample had attended primary school, or currently attended school, with only 6.5 per cent of the
sample never having attended primary school.20
The probability of enrolment at primary school was found to be significantly and positively
associated with age for girls and boys within the sample, implying that younger individuals are
less likely to enrol.  This may be picking up changing parental attitudes on the quality of
schooling and its returns.
                                                          
19Marginal and impact effects are reported for all variables except for the village and tribal dummies. The
significance of any of the differences between the male and female impact and marginal effects are not
reported here but in the appendix. The test of the difference between the male and female coefficients is
equivalent to looking at the significance of the gender slope dummy for the variable in question.
20This regression excludes some of the independent variables (some of the tribal and some district dummies
and secondary education of heads and spouses) because they had a collinear relationship with the dependent
variable on one side. For example, if either the spouse or the household head had secondary education all of
their children would have enrolled in primary school. Because of this relationship it was not possible to
estimate the regression with these variables included.
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Table 6: Selected Impact and Marginal Effects from the Logit Regression on Primary
School Attendance
Variable Marginal effects/ Marginal effects/ Marginal effects/
Impact effects Impact effects for boys Impact effect for girls
AGEHD 0.0004
HEADSEX 0.0502
MUSLIM 0.050 0.008
PAGAN -0.054  -0.077*
OCCHD2  -0.112** -0.078*
OCCHD3 0.047 0.125**
OCCHD4 0.011 0.059
OCCHD5 -0.081 0.007
POSKID -0.003  -0.006**
NOCDHH 0.006***
TYPMRR 0.015  -0.088**
MARIT2 0.099 -0.041
MARIT3 0.017 -0.0004
MARIT4 0.080 0.061
HDPRIM 0.114*** 0.049*
SPOPRIM 0.038 0.111***
ILLIT  -0.064**
AGEKID 0.003***
sample size 2617
Test Statistics
Log of likelihood function -394
Likelihood ratio test statistic 401***
McFadden’s Pseudo Rsquared 0.41
*- significant at the 10% level
**- significant at the 5% level
***- significant at the 1% level
The regression results predicting the probability of ever having attended school show a close
relationship between household characteristics and the probability of enrolment.  Division of
labour within the household implies that mother’s and daughter’s household labour time is
substitutable.  Changes in mothers opportunities outside the household will result in an income
and substitution effect with regards to her daughters allocation of time to household chores.  The
increased income to the family will imply that more resources are available and the total amount
of labour time needed for household reproduction may fall (through, for example, the use of
processed foods).  The income effect will have a positive effect on girls schooling chances
through a general increase in resources available for schooling as well as a fall in the demand for
her labour time within the household.  The substitution effect will cause the daughters to take on
more of the household chores in replace of the mother implying that they will have less time to go
to school.  It is possible that either of these effects will dominate.
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Girls from households with heads who are involved in some form of trade, are 12.5 per cent more
likely to have enrolled in school compared with those in farming households.  This may be
proxying for an income effect (with the possible interpretation that girls education is more income
elastic).  If this is the case then it is initially surprising that the impact of households in paid
employment is not significant.  However, wage levels, particularly within the government sector
have been very low and indications suggest that trading families may have higher incomes (URT
1993).  Alternatively, there may be less need for girls labour relative to boys labour in trading
households compared to the relative labour demands in farming households.  Another possibility
may be that returns to education for girls (e.g.  basic numeracy) are perceived to be more useful in
trading households owing to the possibility of teenage girls helping with the business.
Individuals from households which follow Pagan beliefs have a lower probability of ever having
attended school compared to Christian households with the probability of attendance being
reduced by 7.7 per cent for girls.  Cultural preferences in terms of attitudes towards education,
income effects, differences in household production systems or supply effects are likely to be
underlying this result.  Groups which still practice traditional beliefs may have been more likely to
be nomadic hence creating problems in terms of access to education.  Interpretation of this result
is tentative because the surveyed areas are predominantly Christian and therefore other groups
(i.e. Pagan and Muslim groups) in the sample are unlikely to be representative.
The negative effect of belonging to a cattle herding household for boys and girls compared to
belonging to a farming household (lowering the probability of enrolment by 11.2 per cent for boys
and 7.8 per cent for girls) is probably due to the higher opportunity costs of children’s labour in
such households.  This is particularly true for boys who are often responsible for grazing the
cattle.  In addition, the connection with cattle rearing may also be picking up supply problems of
bringing education to nomadic groups.
As would be expected the education level of parents improves the probability of school
enrolment.  Basic literacy of the household head improves both girls and boys chances equally,
with offspring from illiterate households having a six per cent lower probability of enrolling.  This
impact is in addition to the positive effect of parents having primary education, and suggests a
positive role for adult literacy programmes.  The impact of head’s primary education suggests that
the head’s education has a much greater influence on male children (primary education increasing
boys chances of enrolment by 11.4 per cent and girls by 4.9 per cent) whereas the spouse’s
primary education has a greater influence on the female children, increasing girls enrolment
chances by 11.1 per cent but having an insignificant effect on boys enrolment.  This relationship
has also been found by Mason and Khandker (1996), Tansel (1993) and Appleton, Collier and
Horsnell (1990).  The greater influence of mothers on female children may be due to mothers
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having a relatively stronger preference for their daughters education and their education affording
them either increased household decision-making power or increased economic status.  Belonging
to a polygamous household has a negative effect on the probability of girls (although not boys)
enrolling, lowering it by 8.8 per cent, which may result from a lower status of females within such
households and their unequal claim on household resources compared to boys.  Interestingly,
belonging to a female-headed household is positively associated with enrolment, for boys and
girls, although the effect is not significant in this regression.
In addition to the characteristics of the parents, how many siblings the child has and their birth
order is thought to influence a child’s potential access to schooling.  The number of children
within a household is likely to effect the level of resources available to each individual child,
negatively through the need to share resources more widely and positively through the potential of
older children to provide support for younger children.  Children within a household may also
share household work loads, with an increased number of children potentially reducing each
individual’s work load.  However, given a situation of a rigidly defined gender division of labour
the child’s sex and that of their siblings is likely to affect the impact of additional children on their
educational attainments (Parish and Wills 1993).
Birth order within the family is also likely to be important, as well as the relative age of other
siblings.  Where children, mainly girls, take on the responsibility for caring for younger siblings,
being born early may increase the opportunity cost of schooling.  Where education is treated as an
investment good, once some children in the family have education and secured some future
income for the parents this may alter household preferences for further educated children.
Additionally, the experience of one child attending school may effect the probability of younger
children attending school, either positively (through increasing knowledge about school life, and
awareness that girls may perform successfully in academic subjects) or negatively (where bad
experiences have occurred, e.g.  a girl is expelled due to pregnancy and hence the parents feel
investment is wasted).21
In order to explore the effect of birth order and siblings, a variety of specifications were used
including ones which separated siblings by gender and whether they were older or younger.  The
use of birth order and the total number of children in the household proved to be a preferable
specification, although it remains unclear exactly how siblings influence education decisions.
What is clear is that boys and girls appear to be affected by birth order in a different manner,
supporting the notion that boys and girls have differential access to household resources and/or
experience a gendered division of household labour.
                                                          
21Current policy in Tanzania allows expulsion of school girls due to pregnancy. The policy remains under
review but was not changed in the 1995 Education Act Amendment
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The coefficient on birth order in this regression does not have an effect on boys enrolment, but the
lower the birth order for girls the worse their chances of enrolling, with a marginal effect of 0.6
per cent.  This may be indicating that younger girls come low in the order of allocating resources
or that household preferences towards education change.  The positive and significant effect of
the number of children in the household, implies that both boys’ and girls’ chances of schooling
improves where there are more children in the household.  The marginal effect is 0.6 per cent for
boys and girls.  This positive effect could be due to the opportunities for other children to share
the household work load, lowering the effective opportunity cost of each child’s schooling or that
children from large families benefit from remittances from older siblings.
In general, although the regression is significant the impacts are fairly small.  For the majority of
offspring in each category the probability of at least initially enrolling in school is high within this
sample.  One of the strongest effects is parental education.  Although there is a possibility that this
is proxying for an income effect, other comparable studies have found low income elasticity’s of
demand for education in Tanzania (Collier et al 1990: 130, Mason and Khandker 1996).
4.2 Completion of Primary School
The second logit regression considered whether children completed primary schooling conditional
on enrolling in primary school.  Children of 15 years and over were considered although this was
older than the official end of primary school due to the potential for late enrolment to result in 13-
14 year olds still not completing schooling.
It may be expected that completion of primary education may be more closely associated with
household characteristics than initial enrolment due to the fact that initial enrolment is
compulsory and completion is not.  Overall 10 per cent of the sample who had attended primary
school dropped out before completion.
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Table 7: Selected Marginal and Impact Effects for the Logit Regression on Primary School
Completion
Variable Marginal Effects/ Marginal Effects/ Marginal effects/
Impact effects Impact effects for boys Impact effects for girls
AGEHD 0.002* 0.0004
HEADSEX 0.064** 0.028
MUSLIM  -0.068** 0.021
PAGAN 0.016 -0.003
OCCHD2 0.014 -0.021
OCCHD3 0.043 -0.045
OCCHD4 -0.002 0.057
OCCHD5 -0.008 0.048
POSKID  -0.008*  0.034*
NOCDHH 0.012*
TYPMRR 0.004 0.030
MARIT2  -0.074* -0.041
MARIT3 -0.064 -0.015
MARIT4 -0.006 -0.025
HDPRIM 0.040* 0.067***
HDSEC -0.033 0.051
SPOPRIM 0.061*** 0.047**
SPOSEC 0.016 0.028
ILLIT -0.015
AGEKID  -0.004**
Sample size 1925
Test Statistics
Log of likelihood function -544
Likelihood ratio test statistic 164***
McFadden’s Pseudo Rsquared 0.27
*- significant at the 10% level
**- significant at the 5% level
***- significant at the 1% level
The regression for primary school completion does not have as large an explanatory power as that
for initial enrolment, the McFadden’s Pseudo R squared is 0.27 compared with 0.41 in the first
model.  This suggests that omitted variables are more of a problem here and that the variables
included in the regression are not as important in explaining completion compared to initial
enrolments.  Qualitative information on the causes of drop-out from school in two districts in
Tanzania in 1995 suggests that although drop-out is closely related to poverty, many social factors
also play a strong role with the pupils themselves sometimes taking actions which result in drop-
out independently of their families’ wishes (IDS and MOEC 1996).  If this is the case then we
would not necessarily expect household characteristics to have such a strong influence on the
probability of dropping out of school.
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In terms of completion of primary school, age was found to reduce the probability of completion
for both boys and girls.  Constrained education access prior to the UPE drive is likely to explain
this result since completion is treated as completing at least 7 years of schooling and therefore
incomplete primary schools and exam barriers prior to 1970 will have increased the percentage of
non completers in the older age groups.  Recent evidence suggests a rise in the drop-out rate in the
late 1980s and early 1990s (World Bank 1995, IDS and MOEC 1996) however, this was not
evidenced by this data set.22
The effect of the socio-economic status of the household on the probability of primary school
completion is not picked up strongly within this regression.  The occupation of the household
head does not have a significant effect on the probability of completion.  However, education of
the head and spouse does increase the probability of completion.  Basic literacy of the household
head does not improve offspring completion chances, but heads having attended primary school
does, with the effect being similar for boys and girls (increasing girls chances by 6.7 per cent and
boys by 4 per cent).  However, children from households with heads with additional secondary
education do not further improve their chances of completion.  A similar relationship occurs with
spouses education, with primary education increasing the probability of completion (6.1 per cent
for boys and 4.7 per cent for girls), but secondary education having no additional effect.  The
theory that spouses education has a greater impact on girls’ education than on boys and visa versa
for household heads appears to be contradicted here, but it should be noted that the differences in
the effects on boys and girls are not statistically significant.
Significant gender differences do, however, appear in the impact of religion, household heads’
gender, marital status and age.  Muslim boys are 6.8 per cent less likely to complete school than
Christian boys, although no difference is picked up for girls or for those from Pagan households.
The latter may be indicating that the earlier result (a negative effect on enrolment in Pagan
households) was a supply rather than a demand problem.  If a child from a Pagan household has
initial access to school then they are as likely to complete as a child from a Christian household.
It is unclear why the negative effect of being Muslim is only significant on boys completion; the
impact of Islam on boys completion could be being caused by boys possible attendance at
Madrasa classes constraining their ability to fully attend formal school or it could be proxying for
a gender sensitive income effect.  Alternatively, when the results are interpreted in a different
way, they may be suggesting that Christian boys stand more chance of completion which may be
indicating a gender bias within Christian households.  It may be the case that the Muslim
households in predominantly Christian areas have different characteristics to other Muslim
households hence little generalisation can be made of this result.  However, it is interesting in that
                                                          
22Variations in the model specifications, including non linear specifications of the age variable and a slope
dummy for the under 21 group did not pick up any significant effect of an increase in drop out rates in the
younger groups.
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it challenges the common interpretation that Muslim girls suffer an additional disadvantage in
terms of education access.
The negative impact of coming from a divorced household for boys and the positive impact of
older households heads, may be indicating a need for discipline and stability for boys in order to
ensure their completion.  The first regression tentatively suggested that female-headed households
appear to put a higher priority on their children’s education, and one possible reason for this effect
showing on boys’ completion chances and not on girls’ could be that the benefit to girls of being in
a female-headed household where education is a greater priority in terms of income allocation
may be slightly offset by the need for female-headed households to use daughter’s labour as a
substitute to their own.  This result, however, needs to be interpreted in the context of the
marriage status of the family.  For example, if the boy comes from a divorced household there is a
significant negative effect on completion chances and more female-headed households are
divorced which will reduce the positive impact of coming from a female-headed household for
boys.
The positive effect on the number of children in the household, similarly to the enrolment
regression, may be indicating the benefits of having more elder children in the family who are
able to provide additional financial support.  The position of the child, although only significant at
the 10 per cent level, slightly reduces the probability of boys completing (0.8 per cent) and raises
the probability of girls completing (3.4 per cent).  The effect on girls suggests that younger girls
stand more chance of completing, possibly due to having less child care responsibilities and hence
lower opportunity costs of schooling.  This result slightly contradicts that found within the
enrolment regression and may be suggesting that girls domestic work, has a more detrimental
effect on completion than enrolment, possibly due to girls tiredness at school, poor attendance,
and consequently lower performance.
4.3 Attendance at Secondary School
The logit on secondary school attendance considers the attendance or non-attendance of all those
offspring who had completed primary school.  Of those who have completed primary school 26.6
per cent go on to secondary school.  Again this confirms the greater educational achievements of
this sample compared to the national average.
25
Table 8: Selected Marginal and Impact Effects from the Logit Regression on Secondary
School Attendance Conditional on Completion of Primary School
Variable Marginal Effects/ Marginal Effects/ Marginal effects/
Impact effects Impact effects for boys impact effect for girls
AGEHD 0.003*
HEADSEX 0.065 0.137**
MUSLIM  -0.087** -0.007
PAGAN  -0.169***  -0.188**
OCCHD2 0.045 -0.053
OCCHD3 -0.246 0.131
OCCHD4 0.0498 0.063
OCCHD5 0.022 0.125*
POSKID -0.005 0.032
NOCDHH 0.022***
TYPMRR 0.020 -0.069**
MARIT2 0.005 0.024
MARIT3 0.063  -0.082
MARIT4 0.015  -0.191*
HDPRIM 0.026 -0.004
HDSEC 0.163*** 0.216***
SPOPRIM 0.012 0.097***
SPOSEC 0.068 0.176**
ILLIT  -0.066**
AGEKID 0.011
Sample size 1726
Test Statistics
Log of likelihood function -819
Likelihood ratio test statistic 362***
McFadden’s Pseudo Rsquared 0.37
*- significant at the 10% level
**- significant at the 5% level
***- significant at the 1% level
The logit for attendance at secondary school, given that individuals have already completed
primary school, reveal very strong relationships between household characteristics and secondary
school attendance.  One of the strongest predictors of attendance at secondary school is whether
or not parents have attended secondary school, suggesting the important impact of parental
education upon that of their children.
The limited education access facing the older groups within the sample appears to be reversed
when considering which individuals attended secondary school, with both older males and older
females that have completed primary school being more likely to attend secondary school.
Referring back to Figure 1, it should be noted that it is the change in the percentage of Standard
VII leavers that graduate to secondary school (caused by disproportionate growth in the primary
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sector) which drives this effect rather than a decline in the overall enrolment rate at secondary
level.
As discussed in Section 2 the supply constraints are more binding at the secondary level.  Before
the 1980’s, when private secondary schools were tightly restricted, secondary school attendance
was intended to be determined mainly by meritocratic criteria, determined by success in the
Primary School Leaving exam and district male and female quotas.  It was thought that under this
theoretically equitable scenario secondary school access would have been relatively independent
of households socio-economic status.  Previous empirical research (Malekela 1986, Knight and
Sabot 1990) however, found close relationships between household characteristics and secondary
school attendance in Tanzania. Higher socio-economic groups are over represented in those
gaining access to secondary school implying that government resources were not being targeted at
the most needy.  Between 1980 and 1992 the percentage of secondary pupils enrolling into the
private secondary school sector rose from 44 to 60 percent.  While in some community schools
access is still partly dependent on examination performance, for the vast majority household
socio-economic status determines access.  The involvement of NGOs and religious groups in
establishing secondary schools has raised fears that access to secondary education has become
increasingly inequitable along religious, gender, ethnic, and geographical lines.  (Galabawa 1994).
However, the general expansion is thought to have increased the access by lower socio-economic
groups to secondary education, and hence has reduced inequities.  Indeed, many non-government
schools are of poorer quality and serve in one way lower socio-economic groups.
Religious inequities are strong, with Muslim boys being particularly disadvantaged.  Boys
belonging to a Muslim household relative to a Christian household have an 8.7 per cent lower
probability of attending secondary school.  Belonging to a Pagan household lowers the probability
of attending secondary school for both boys and girls (by 16.9 per cent and 18.8 per cent
respectively), although once again this result involves small cell sizes.  The negative effect of
being Muslim is a likely result given that Muslims have traditionally been perceived as having
experienced unequal access to secondary schooling, and the fact that Christian denomination
secondary schools outnumber Muslim schools by 10:1 (Galabawa 1994).  The lack of a
relationship for girls is again interesting.  However, a strong negative relationship for girls
belonging to polygamous households is found.  This may imply that the common view of unequal
access for Muslim girls has more to do with cultural arrangements, persistence of traditional
values, power and resource allocation decisions than religious beliefs.
The important role mothers have on girls’ education is clearly shown in this regression.  Girls
from female-headed households increase their probability of going to secondary by 13.7 per cent,
whereas the gender of the household head does not have a significant effect on boys.  This
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suggests greater prioritising of education expenditures by female heads, despite the fact that they
are likely to be of lower socio-economic status.  This result parallels that found by the
Demographic Health Survey in 1991/1992 that "married mothers whose husband lives in the
household are more constrained in their allocation of resources to health care utilisation for the
welfare of their children than single mothers or mothers whose husbands are living outside the
household" (Katapa and Astore 1993 cited in Kaijage and Tibaijuka 1996).  These results appear
to be supporting some kind of ’co-operative conflict’ model of allocating household resources,
whereby men and women have different demands for education for their daughters and sons, due
to economic reasons and/or differing preferences and responsibilities and their ability to assert
control over resources in the household.  Where women have greater control over resources, either
due to higher education levels, or increased income contributions to the household, studies have
frequently found increased consumption of food and child welfare goods (Tinker 1987, Hoddinott
and Haddad 1991).
Additionally, spouses’ primary education increases the probability of girls going to secondary
school by 9.7 per cent and spouses secondary education by a further 17.6 per cent (i.e.  27.3 per
cent more likely to go in households with spouses with secondary education compared to
households with spouses with no education), but again there is no effect for boys.  Why the
mother’s education position should come out so strongly in favour of girls at this level, when in
the previous regression it appeared to be supportive but more gender neutral is interesting.  One
possible explanation could be that, given the greater costs involved in secondary education, girls’
unequal access to resources comes into play more at this level, and hence mothers’ control over
household resources and their prioritisation of education investment has a critical role in girls’
secondary school access.
Secondary education of the household head is positively and strongly related to both boys and
girls access to secondary school (21.6 per cent for girls and 16.3 per cent for boys although the
difference between them is statistically insignificant).  Although no effect is found for whether the
head has attended primary school, basic literacy does improve offspring’s chances of attending
secondary school with boys and girls coming from households with illiterate heads having a 6.6
per cent smaller chance of attending secondary school.
The slightly greater relevance of occupation and marriage status on girls, may be implying that
girls access is determined more strongly by household socio-economic status than boys, a result
which has been found in other research (Sumra 1993, Appleton et al 1990, Malekela 1986).  Girls
from single parent households are 19.1 per cent less likely to attend secondary school, possibly
due to the need for their labour in daily reproduction of the household.  This effect is likely to
reduce the positive impact for a girl of being in a female-headed household.
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In line with the other regressions the number of children within the household has a positive effect
on education attainments, for both boys and girls.  However, the position of the child is
insignificant in this case.
The probability of secondary school attendance within this sample is therefore highly effected by
the household characteristics for which we have data.  For example, the probability of attendance
at secondary school for a girl from a Pagan, polygamous, farming household where the head and
first spouse have no education is 14.8 per cent (with all other independent variables taken at their
mean).  Whereas the probability of attendance of a girl from a Christian, monogamous household
where both parents have secondary education and the father is a trader is 80 per cent.  These
figures compare closely to those found by Knight and Sabot (1990) that parental secondary
education has a strong influence on lower secondary completion.
5.  CONCLUSION
These three regressions clearly reflect substantial intra household differences, between the way in
which household characteristics affect outcomes for boys and girls, and how male and female
influence over resource decisions differently affect outcomes.
The regressions reflect a different demand for education within female-headed households
compared to male-headed households, boys being significantly more likely to complete primary
school and girls being far more likely to attend secondary school if they are from female-headed
households.
These regressions give weight to the notion that mothers’ education has more influence on girls
enrolment decisions whereas fathers education’ has more influence on sons enrolment.  Critically,
married mothers’ primary education can increase the probability of girls enrolling in secondary
school by 9.7 per cent and their secondary schooling by a further 17.6 per cent, while having no
significant effect on boys.  The different effects of having married mothers for girls and boys may
be an income effect (households with educated spouses being relatively better off), hence
implying girls’ greater vulnerability to household income, and consequently cost sharing
measures.  Alternatively, the result could be caused by mothers having a greater preference for
educated daughters and, as held within a ’cooperative conflict’ model, education allowing them
greater voice within household decision-making.  The important role of mothers in determining
girls’ education outcomes, and the positive role of spouse’s education suggests that investment in
girls’ education would have benefits in terms of future education decisions.  Therefore, gender
segregated policies in the short term would ultimately become redundant as women are elevated to
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a position where they can better address inequity of resource allocations and labour
responsibilities within the household.
In general, the three regressions imply that educated households are able to ensure their children
receive relatively high levels of education although the means through which this is achieved are
uncertain (e.g.  income effects, assistance with school work etc.).  This lack of intergenerational
mobility is less striking in terms of primary education.  The results on secondary attendance imply
that to improve intergenerational mobility there is a need for effective targeting of support to
individuals, particularly girls, from households with low levels of human capital.
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APPENDIX
All variables that are prefixed with a G are the gender slope dummies (i.e. 1 if female, 0
otherwise.
A1: Descriptive Statistics for the Enrolment Regression
MEAN STD DEV MIN MAX SUM VARIANCE
C 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 2617.000 0.000
VILL 0.085 0.279 0.000 1.000 223.000 0.078
VILL3 0.070 0.254 0.000 1.000 182.000 0.065
GVILL3 0.035 0.183 0.000 1.000 91.000 0.034
VILL5 0.048 0.213 0.000 1.000 125.000 0.046
VILL7 0.087 0.282 0.000 1.000 228.000 0.080
VILL8 0.041 0.199 0.000 1.000 108.000 0.040
GVILL8 0.023 0.151 0.000 1.000 61.000 0.023
VILL9 0.088 0.283 0.000 1.000 230.000 0.080
VILL10 0.081 0.272 0.000 1.000 211.000 0.074
GVILL10 0.039 0.194 0.000 1.000 102.000 0.037
VILL11 0.069 0.254 0.000 1.000 181.000 0.064
VILL12 0.042 0.202 0.000 1.000 111.000 0.041
GVILL12 0.022 0.147 0.000 1.000 58.000 0.022
VILL13 0.019 0.138 0.000 1.000 51.000 0.019
VILL14 0.058 0.234 0.000 1.000 152.000 0.055
GVILL14 0.031 0.174 0.000 1.000 82.000 0.030
VILL15 0.058 0.235 0.000 1.000 153.000 0.055
KIDSEX 0.491 0.500 0.000 1.000 1284.000 0.250
AGEHD 53.360 9.058 30.000 86.000 139644.000 82.040
HEADSEX 0.156 0.363 0.000 1.000 408.000 0.132
ISLAM 0.157 0.364 0.000 1.000 412.000 0.133
GISLAM 0.075 0.263 0.000 1.000 195.000 0.069
PAGAN 0.060 0.238 0.000 1.000 157.000 0.056
GPAGAN 0.029 0.168 0.000 1.000 76.000 0.028
OCCHD2 0.053 0.225 0.000 1.000 140.000 0.051
GOCCHD2 0.022 0.146 0.000 1.000 57.000 0.021
OCCHD3 0.054 0.226 0.000 1.000 141.000 0.051
GOCCHD3 0.028 0.165 0.000 1.000 73.000 0.027
OCCHD4 0.085 0.279 0.000 1.000 223.000 0.078
GOCCHD4 0.042 0.201 0.000 1.000 110.000 0.040
OCCHD5 0.041 0.199 0.000 1.000 108.000 0.040
GOCCHD5 0.016 0.127 0.000 1.000 43.000 0.016
POSKID 3.252 1.811 1.000 7.000 8510.000 3.281
GPOSKD 1.609 2.069 0.000 7.000 4210.000 4.279
PSKDSQR 13.854 13.626 1.000 49.000 36256.000 185.664
GPSKDSQR 6.865 11.829 0.000 49.000 17966.000 139.922
NOCDHH 6.641 3.381 0.000 36.000 17380.000 11.434
NCDHSQR 55.535 90.870 0.000 1296.000 145336.000 8257.446
TYPMRR2 0.227 0.419 0.000 1.000 595.000 0.176
GTYPMRR2 0.110 0.313 0.000 1.000 288.000 0.098
MARIT2 0.052 0.223 0.000 1.000 137.000 0.050
GMARIT2 0.029 0.169 0.000 1.000 77.000 0.029
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MEAN STD DEV MIN MAX SUM VARIANCE
MARIT3 0.081 0.272 0.000 1.000 211.000 0.074
GMARIT3 0.036 0.187 0.000 1.000 95.000 0.035
MARIT4 0.035 0.184 0.000 1.000 92.000 0.034
GMARIT4 0.019 0.137 0.000 1.000 50.000 0.019
HDPRIM 0.707 0.455 0.000 1.000 1849.000 0.207
GHDPRIM 0.344 0.475 0.000 1.000 901.000 0.226
SPOPRIM 0.451 0.498 0.000 1.000 1179.000 0.248
GSPOPRIM 0.219 0.414 0.000 1.000 574.000 0.171
ILLIT3 0.212 0.409 0.000 1.000 555.000 0.167
AGEKID 22.319 7.842 11.000 55.000 58409.000 61.496
TRIBE214 0.007 0.085 0.000 1.000 19.000 0.007
TRIBE233 0.012 0.108 0.000 1.000 31.000 0.012
TRIBE234 0.015 0.120 0.000 1.000 38.000 0.014
TRIBE242 0.028 0.164 0.000 1.000 72.000 0.027
Table A2:  Full Regression Results for Whether the Child has Enrolled in Primary School or not
Parameter Estimate Standard Error t-statistic
C 3.02292 1.02714 2.94304
VILL -0.5678 0.435253 -1.30453
VILL3 -0.68173 0.900588 -0.75699
GVILL3 -1.88713 0.969488 -1.94652
VILL5 -1.10195 0.537812 -2.04895
VILL7 0.135209 0.718818 0.188099
VILL8 1.02837 1.08046 0.951795
GVILL8 -2.30695 1.22533 -1.88272
VILL9 -1.40914 0.470122 -2.99738
VILL10 1.11982 1.08871 1.02857
GVILL10 -2.43856 1.16058 -2.10115
VILL11 1.12186 1.04941 1.06903
VILL12 -1.62982 0.722087 -2.25709
GVILL12 -1.07158 0.918738 -1.16636
VILL13 -0.67885 0.861672 -0.78783
VILL14 -0.09265 0.76648 -0.12087
GVILL14 -1.54346 0.873597 -1.76678
VILL15 0.140519 0.676268 0.207786
KIDSEX 1.95689 0.863711 2.26567
AGEHD 0.010092 0.019239 0.52453
HEADSEX 0.601096 0.521153 1.1534
ISLAM 0.602424 0.54364 1.10813
GISLAM -0.51556 0.658608 -0.78281
PAGAN -0.56423 0.560547 -1.00657
GPAGAN -0.21874 0.720804 -0.30347
OCCHD2 -1.09659 0.524422 -2.09104
GOCCHD2 0.30466 0.675087 0.45129
OCCHD3 0.512294 0.842296 0.608211
GOCCHD3 1.40202 1.34982 1.03868
OCCHD4 0.117685 0.823526 0.142904
GOCCHD4 0.618879 1.15044 0.53795
OCCHD5 -0.81233 0.799602 -1.01592
GOCCHD5 0.889135 0.973975 0.912894
POSKID 0.204619 0.341597 0.599009
GPOSKD -0.90192 0.489966 -1.84077
32
Parameter Estimate Standard Error t-statistic
PSKDSQR -0.04412 0.044286 -0.99626
GPSKDSQR 0.129803 0.065917 1.96919
NOCDHH 0.227677 0.06733 3.38148
NCDHSQR -6.83E-03 2.19E-03 -3.11629
TYPMRR2 0.182072 0.409313 0.444824
GTYPMRR2 -1.07408 0.521374 -2.06009
MARIT2 1.40204 1.18905 1.17912
GMARIT2 -1.83106 1.24708 -1.46828
MARIT3 0.195613 0.664002 0.294597
GMARIT3 -0.19114 0.781535 -0.24458
MARIT4 1.04924 0.988779 1.06114
GMARIT4 -0.28 1.10791 -0.25273
HDPRIM 1.29251 0.416432 3.10377
GHDPRIM -0.8046 0.506068 -1.5899
SPOPRIM 0.389445 0.442194 0.88071
GSPOPRIM 0.953007 0.594193 1.60387
ILLIT3 -0.66639 0.267687 -2.48942
AGEKID -0.07723 0.02277 -3.39162
TRIBE214 -1.71203 0.833393 -2.05429
TRIBE233 -1.34668 1.04775 -1.28531
TRIBE234 -0.15969 1.19681 -0.13343
TRIBE242 -0.1219 1.08183 -0.11268
Predicted Outcomes
Enrol Do not enrol
Actual 2470 147
Correct Predictions 2429 47
assumes if fitted probability is greater than 0.7 child will complete
Table A3: Descriptive Statistics for the Completion Regression
MEAN STD DEV MIN MAX SUM VARIANCE
ENDKID 0.89662 0.30453 0 1 1726 0.092738
C 1 0 1 1 1925 0
VILL 0.097143 0.29623 0 1 187 0.087752
VILL3 0.065455 0.24739 0 1 126 0.061202
VILL4 0.088831 0.28457 0 1 171 0.080982
GVILL4 0.041039 0.19843 0 1 79 0.039375
VILL5 0.040519 0.19723 0 1 78 0.038898
GVILL5 0.016623 0.12789 0 1 32 0.016356
VILL6 0.050909 0.21987 0 1 98 0.048342
VILL7 0.095065 0.29338 0 1 183 0.086072
VILL8 0.044156 0.20549 0 1 85 0.042228
VILL9 0.090909 0.28755 0 1 175 0.082688
VILL10 0.081558 0.27376 0 1 157 0.074946
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MEAN STD DEV MIN MAX SUM VARIANCE
VILL11 0.071169 0.25717 0 1 137 0.066138
VILL12 0.032727 0.17797 0 1 63 0.031673
VILL13 0.020779 0.14268 0 1 40 0.020358
VILL14 0.056623 0.23118 0 1 109 0.053445
GVILL14 0.028571 0.16664 0 1 55 0.02777
VILL15 0.051948 0.22198 0 1 100 0.049275
GVILL15 0.029091 0.16811 0 1 56 0.028259
VILL16 0.058701 0.23513 0 1 113 0.055284
AGEHD 54.44987 8.86437 32 86 104816 78.57714
GAGEHD 26.92779 27.89104 0 86 51836 777.91006
HEADSEX 0.16312 0.36957 0 1 314 0.13658
GHEADSEX 0.081039 0.27297 0 1 156 0.07451
MUSLIM 0.14857 0.35576 0 1 286 0.12656
GMUSLIM 0.070649 0.2563 0 1 136 0.065692
PAGAN 0.051429 0.22093 0 1 99 0.048809
GPAGAN 0.024416 0.15438 0 1 47 0.023832
OCCHD2 0.041039 0.19843 0 1 79 0.039375
GOCCHD2 0.018182 0.13364 0 1 35 0.017861
OCCHD3 0.054026 0.22613 0 1 104 0.051134
GOCCHD3 0.028571 0.16664 0 1 55 0.02777
OCCHD4 0.073247 0.26061 0 1 141 0.067917
GOCCHD4 0.032208 0.1766 0 1 62 0.031187
OCCHD5 0.038442 0.19231 0 1 74 0.036983
GOCCHD5 0.015584 0.12389 0 1 30 0.01535
POSKID 2.99532 1.73908 1 7 5766 3.02441
GPOSKD 1.50494 1.94589 0 7 2897 3.78649
PSKDSQR 11.99481 12.63772 1 49 23090 159.71203
GPSKDSQR 6.04935 10.7742 0 49 11645 116.08332
NOCDHH 6.58338 2.82124 0 36 12673 7.95939
NCDHSQR 51.2961 55.28072 0 1296 98745 3055.958
TYPMRR 0.22649 0.41867 0 1 436 0.17529
GTYPMRR 0.11013 0.31313 0 1 212 0.098052
MARIT2 0.050909 0.21987 0 1 98 0.048342
GMARIT2 0.028052 0.16516 0 1 54 0.027279
MARIT3 0.088831 0.28457 0 1 171 0.080982
GMARIT3 0.04 0.19601 0 1 77 0.03842
MARIT4 0.036883 0.18852 0 1 71 0.035541
GMARIT4 0.01974 0.13914 0 1 38 0.019361
HDPRIM 0.71584 0.45113 0 1 1378 0.20352
GHDPRIM 0.35221 0.47778 0 1 678 0.22828
HDSEC 0.075325 0.26398 0 1 145 0.069687
GHDSEC 0.035844 0.18595 0 1 69 0.034577
SPOPRIM 0.4561 0.4982 0 1 878 0.2482
GSPOPRIM 0.22649 0.41867 0 1 436 0.17529
SPOSEC 0.019221 0.13734 0 1 37 0.018861
GSPOSEC 0.0093506 0.096271 0 1 18 0.009268
ILLIT 0.19948 0.39971 0 1 384 0.15977
AGEKID 24.36571 6.792 15 55 46904 46.13126
TRIBE10 0.0083117 0.090812 0 1 16 0.0082469
TRIBE14 0.0067532 0.081921 0 1 13 0.0067111
TRIBE33 0.013506 0.11546 0 1 26 0.013331
TRIBE34 0.015584 0.12389 0 1 30 0.01535
TRIBE42 0.021299 0.14442 0 1 41 0.020856
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Table A4: Full Regression Results for Completion at Primary
Parameter Estimate Standard Error t-statistic
C 2.12729 0.790009 2.69274
VILL 0.891179 0.520768 1.71128
VILL3 -1.83603 0.482382 -3.80618
VILL4 0.634906 0.850214 0.74676
GVILL4 0.942597 1.27692 0.738179
VILL5 -1.6982 0.647845 -2.62131
GVILL5 2.11976 0.845814 2.50618
VILL6 1.52706 0.845392 1.80633
VILL7 -0.981214 0.504328 -1.94559
VILL8 0.092825 0.485218 0.191306
VILL9 -1.3335 0.471094 -2.83064
VILL10 -0.062317 0.5086 -0.122526
VILL11 -0.181203 0.48965 -0.370067
VILL12 -0.171662 0.66118 -0.25963
VILL13 -1.68041 0.612416 -2.7439
VILL14 -0.869664 0.599884 -1.44972
GVILL14 0.693217 0.672561 1.03071
VILL15 -0.965704 0.6349 -1.52103
GVILL15 2.59381 1.15578 2.24421
VILL16 0.063835 0.548723 0.116334
AGEHD 0.024685 0.01766 1.39781
GAGEHD -0.019353 0.010964 -1.76523
HEADSEX 0.99003 0.506523 1.95456
GHEADSEX -0.644607 0.686212 -0.93937
MUSLIM -0.688251 0.350199 -1.96531
GMUSLIM 1.00975 0.476165 2.12058
PAGAN 0.208042 0.573856 0.362534
GPAGAN -0.239812 0.777185 -0.308565
OCCHD2 0.178166 0.59341 0.30024
GOCCHD2 -0.41075 0.817848 -0.502233
OCCHD3 0.655122 0.615341 1.06465
GOCCHD3 -1.13119 0.743286 -1.52188
OCCHD4 -0.023709 0.471475 -0.050286
GOCCHD4 0.959965 0.909452 1.05554
OCCHD5 -0.093238 0.485222 -0.192156
GOCCHD5 0.826949 0.782334 1.05703
POSKID -0.478546 0.289075 -1.65544
GPOSKD 0.065298 0.372131 0.175471
PSKDSQR 0.061261 0.040986 1.49468
GPSKDSQR -7.21E-03 0.052871 -0.13635
NOCDHH 0.123954 0.091808 1.35015
NCDHSQR 1.52E-04 5.49E-03 0.027784
TYPMRR 0.042342 0.323477 0.130898
GTYPMRR 0.361616 0.447027 0.808935
MARIT2 -0.738098 0.557056 -1.325
GMARIT2 0.295923 0.751374 0.393842
MARIT3 -0.655459 0.517147 -1.26745
GMARIT3 0.477705 0.714468 0.668616
MARIT4 -0.067407 0.790718 -0.085248
GMARIT4 -0.214635 1.0247 -0.209462
HDPRIM 0.427732 0.311919 1.37129
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Parameter Estimate Standard Error t-statistic
GHDPRIM 0.382923 0.368735 1.03848
HDSEC -0.355215 0.562704 -0.631264
GHDSEC 1.16956 0.958936 1.21965
SPOPRIM 0.812322 0.319138 2.54536
GSPOPRIM -0.240981 0.418647 -0.575618
SPOSEC 0.207114 1.10488 0.187455
GSPOSEC 0.182542 1.60035 0.114064
ILLIT -0.173564 0.246092 -0.705281
AGEKID -0.047975 0.020968 -2.28802
TRIBE10 0.821163 1.09015 0.753257
TRIBE14 0.256478 1.12869 0.227234
TRIBE33 0.149645 0.667037 0.224343
TRIBE34 1.38438 1.09195 1.2678
TRIBE42 0.533074 1.09282 0.487795
Predicted Outcomes
Complete Primary Do not complete
Primary
Actual 1726 199
Correct Predictions 1653 45
assumes if fitted probability is greater than 0.7 child will complete
Table A5: Descriptive Statistics for the Secondary Enrolment Regression
MEAN STD DEV MIN MAX SUM VARIANCE
C 1 0 1 1 1726 0
VILL2 0.10255 0.30346 0 1 177 0.092086
VILL3 0.053882 0.22585 0 1 93 0.051008
VILL4 0.097335 0.2965 0 1 168 0.087912
VILL5 0.039397 0.1946 0 1 68 0.037867
VILL6 0.05562 0.22925 0 1 96 0.052557
VILL7 0.093279 0.29091 0 1 161 0.084627
VILL8 0.043453 0.20393 0 1 75 0.041589
GVILL8 0.021437 0.14488 0 1 37 0.020989
VILL9 0.086327 0.28093 0 1 149 0.07892
VILL10 0.084589 0.27835 0 1 146 0.077478
GVILL10 0.039397 0.1946 0 1 68 0.037867
VILL11 0.072422 0.25926 0 1 125 0.067216
VILL12 0.033604 0.18026 0 1 58 0.032493
VILL13 0.017961 0.13285 0 1 31 0.017648
GVILL13 0.0063731 0.0796 0 1 11 0.0063362
VILL14 0.051564 0.22121 0 1 89 0.048934
VILL15 0.054461 0.22699 0 1 94 0.051525
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MEAN STD DEV MIN MAX SUM VARIANCE
VILL16 0.061414 0.24016 0 1 106 0.057675
GVILL16 0.02781 0.16448 0 1 48 0.027052
AGEHD 54.43105 8.89583 32 86 93948 79.13582
GAGEHD 26.6321 27.85192 0 86 45967 775.7295
HEADSEX 0.15643 0.36337 0 1 270 0.13204
GHEADSEX 0.073581 0.26116 0 1 127 0.068206
MUSLIM 0.14253 0.34969 0 1 246 0.12228
GMUSLIM 0.070104 0.2554 0 1 121 0.065227
PAGAN 0.047509 0.21279 0 1 82 0.045278
GPAGAN 0.021437 0.14488 0 1 37 0.020989
OCCHD2 0.039977 0.19596 0 1 69 0.038401
GOCCHD2 0.017381 0.13072 0 1 30 0.017089
OCCHD3 0.052144 0.22238 0 1 90 0.049453
GOCCHD3 0.026072 0.1594 0 1 45 0.025407
OCCHD4 0.075898 0.26491 0 1 131 0.070178
GOCCHD4 0.034762 0.18323 0 1 60 0.033573
OCCHD5 0.034762 0.18323 0 1 60 0.033573
GOCCHD5 0.015064 0.12184 0 1 26 0.014845
POSKID 3.00985 1.75497 1 7 5195 3.0799
GPOSKID 1.4971 1.95329 0 7 2584 3.81535
PSKDSQR 12.13731 12.80599 1 49 20949 163.99331
GPSKDSQR 6.05446 10.86179 0 49 10450 117.97848
NOCDHH 6.64253 2.83952 1 36 11465 8.06286
NCDHSQR 52.18134 57.08609 1 1296 90065 3258.8222
TYPMRR 0.22711 0.41909 0 1 392 0.17564
GTYPMRR 0.11124 0.31452 0 1 192 0.098923
MARIT2 0.044612 0.20651 0 1 77 0.042646
GMARIT2 0.023754 0.15233 0 1 41 0.023204
MARIT3 0.086327 0.28093 0 1 149 0.07892
GMARIT3 0.03708 0.18901 0 1 64 0.035726
MARIT4 0.034183 0.18175 0 1 59 0.033034
GMARIT4 0.017381 0.13072 0 1 30 0.017089
HDPRIM 0.73407 0.44196 0 1 1267 0.19533
GHDPRIM 0.36153 0.48058 0 1 624 0.23096
HDSEC 0.079954 0.2713 0 1 138 0.073604
GHDSEC 0.038818 0.19322 0 1 67 0.037333
SPOPRIM 0.47509 0.49952 0 1 820 0.24952
GSPOPRIM 0.23638 0.42498 0 1 408 0.18061
SPOSEC 0.020278 0.14099 0 1 35 0.019878
GSPOSEC 0.0098494 0.098783 0 1 17 0.009758
ILLIT 0.18772 0.3906 0 1 324 0.15257
AGEKID 24.27057 6.6435 15 55 41891 44.13603
TRIBE10 0.0086906 0.092844 0 1 15 0.0086201
TRIBE14 0.0069525 0.083115 0 1 12 0.0069082
TRIBE33 0.012746 0.11221 0 1 22 0.012591
TRIBE34 0.016802 0.12857 0 1 29 0.016529
TRIBE42 0.023175 0.1505 0 1 40 0.022651
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Table A6: Full Regression Results for Secondary Attendance
Parameter Estimate Standard Error t-statistic
C -3.89558 0.721777 -5.39721
VILL2 -3.14084 0.395008 -7.95133
VILL3 -2.69679 0.465809 -5.78947
VILL4 -3.0158 0.412084 -7.31841
VILL5 -2.463 0.5236 -4.70398
VILL6 -1.60673 0.419966 -3.82586
VILL7 -1.97983 0.401903 -4.92614
VILL8 -1.51441 0.538872 -2.81033
GVILL8 -0.157002 0.774168 -0.202801
VILL9 -0.866319 0.365053 -2.37313
VILL10 -2.60069 0.446754 -5.8213
GVILL10 1.29137 0.465606 2.77353
VILL11 -1.95261 0.371569 -5.25503
VILL12 -2.27289 0.55186 -4.1186
VILL13 -1.45671 0.648357 -2.24677
GVILL13 1.01933 0.912886 1.1166
VILL14 -1.62367 0.417637 -3.88776
VILL15 -1.43058 0.3852 -3.71386
VILL16 -0.568225 0.408205 -1.39201
GVILL16 -0.766328 0.484667 -1.58114
AGEHD 0.021438 0.013716 1.56305
GAGEHD -5.99E-03 8.66E-03 -0.691687
HEADSEX 0.410504 0.393162 1.04411
GHEADSEX 0.404817 0.560896 0.721733
MUSLIM -0.615654 0.31548 -1.95149
GMUSLIM 0.569545 0.401312 1.41921
PAGAN -1.42101 0.588613 -2.41417
GPAGAN -0.255768 0.979913 -0.26101
OCCHD2 0.279333 0.489885 0.570201
GOCCHD2 -0.644468 0.7384 -0.87279
OCCHD3 0.354001 0.394866 0.896509
GOCCHD3 0.4122 0.575273 0.716529
OCCHD4 0.30747 0.325136 0.945664
GOCCHD4 0.076152 0.47844 0.159168
OCCHD5 0.137329 0.486048 0.282543
GOCCHD5 0.591689 0.647493 0.913815
POSKID -6.89E-03 0.201191 -0.03427
GPOSKID -0.247276 0.27882 -0.886866
PSKDSQR -1.88E-03 0.027089 -0.069299
GPSKDSQR 0.05194 0.037602 1.38131
NOCDHH 0.40566 0.108042 3.75466
NCDHSQR -0.019886 6.75E-03 -2.94431
TYPMRR 0.12374 0.236 0.524324
GTYPMRR -0.601062 0.336253 -1.78753
MARIT2 0.03173 0.495499 0.064036
GMARIT2 0.117876 0.699281 0.168567
MARIT3 0.384311 0.394622 0.973872
GMARIT3 -0.971469 0.596957 -1.62737
MARIT4 0.092808 0.714801 0.129838
GMARIT4 -1.8709 1.32161 -1.41562
HDPRIM 0.162759 0.251289 0.647697
GHDPRIM -0.188736 0.316892 -0.595585
HDSEC 0.925142 0.321017 2.88191
GHDSEC 0.27086 0.448923 0.603354
SPOPRIM 0.079274 0.223375 0.354891
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Parameter Estimate Standard Error t-statistic
GSPOPRIM 0.521177 0.308803 1.68773
SPOSEC 0.412622 0.560993 0.735521
GSPOSEC 0.588354 0.792106 0.742772
ILLIT -0.446218 0.226498 -1.97007
AGEKID 0.069762 0.015988 4.3633
TRIBE10 1.06722 0.635509 1.67931
TRIBE14 1.06741 0.820545 1.30086
TRIBE33 -0.724512 0.831128 -0.871721
TRIBE34 0.540326 0.504657 1.07068
TRIBE42 0.631066 0.432644 1.45863
Predicted Outcomes
Enrol in Secondary Do not enrol in
Secondary
Actual 459 1267
Correct Predictions 152 1177
assumes if fitted probability is greater than 0.5 will enrol
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